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Firm Ownership and Rent Sharing
* 
 
We analyse – theoretically and empirically – how private versus public ownership of firms 
affects the degree of rent sharing between firms and their workers. Using a particularly rich 
linked employer-employee dataset from Portugal, covering a large number of corporate 
ownership changes across a wide spectrum of economic sectors over more than 20 years, 
we find a positive relationship between private ownership and rent sharing. Based on our 
theoretical analysis, this result cannot be explained by private firms being more profit oriented 
than public ones. However, the result is consistent with privatisation leading to less job 
security, implying stronger efficiency wage effects. 
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Rent sharing between ￿rms and their workers is a widely documented feature of labour
markets in many countries (e.g., Mumford and Dowrick, 1994; Blanch￿ ower et al., 1996;
Black and Strahan, 2001; Arai, 2003; Estevªo and Tevlin, 2003; Budd et al., 2005; G￿ertz-
gen, 2009). Still, the understanding of which characteristics of ￿rms and workers that
contribute to the size and extent of such rent sharing is still not fully developed. The
present paper explores the e⁄ect of an hitherto rather neglected explanatory variable of
rent sharing, namely corporate ownership. More precisely, we analyse ￿theoretically and
empirically ￿how the degree of private versus public ownership of ￿rms a⁄ects the level
of rent sharing.
To our knowledge, there exists little or no documented theoretical understanding of
the link between ￿rm ownership and rent sharing, and so far, the empirical evidence on
this relationship is fairly scant and also geographically narrow, almost exclusively limited
to economies from Eastern Europe. For example, Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), Dobbeleare
(2004) and Luke and Scha⁄er (2000) explore this relationship in Poland, Bulgaria and
Russia, respectively. Monteiro and Portela (2010) is one exception, but their analysis
is con￿ned to a speci￿c economic industry (banking) in a Western European economy
(Portugal). The evidence from these studies is consensual in suggesting that the degree of
rent sharing is larger in publicly owned ￿rms. However, these studies all su⁄er from some
common drawbacks. They all use data representing only one or a subset of industries.
Data is also collected at ￿rm level, for relatively short time periods, and contains, at best,
a very limited number of ￿rm attributes.1 In addition, these studies lack a theoretical
mechanism that might explain their ￿ndings.
By combining a theoretical model with a comprehensive empirical analysis, we are able
to contribute both to the literature on rent sharing and to the quite separate literature on
public versus private ￿rm ownership. Our empirical contributions rely on the quality and
scope of our data as well as various aspects of our empirical methods and strategies.
1Monteiro and Portela (2010) is an exception as they use very rich data available for 18 years.
2We provide evidence from a country (Portugal) that o⁄ers a particularly rich oppor-
tunity to analyse the e⁄ects of ￿rm ownership changes. Indeed, Portugal has experienced
a comprehensive corporate restructuring process, which included both privatisations and
nationalisations (although more of the former) of a very large number of ￿rms (more than
1000 in total) in several economic sectors (including both manufacturing and services) over
a long period of time. These reforms also led to a number of ￿rms with di⁄erent ownership
con￿gurations (fully private, fully public or mixed ownership) within each industry. These
￿rms are then used as alternative comparison groups to control for industry-speci￿c shocks
and to disentangle ownership from industry e⁄ects.
We also bene￿t from a very rich matched employer-employee dataset (Quadros de
Pessoal) available for more than 20 years. These linked data allows us to build panel
datasets de￿ned at di⁄erent units of observation, ￿rm and worker, as these units are
assigned unique and invariant identi￿ers. Therefore, we are able to control for two sources
of unobserved heterogeneity (worker and ￿rm) and to assess directly the importance of
the level of data aggregation for the magnitude of rent sharing. In the context of rent
sharing, this is, to our knowledge, the ￿rst study that accounts for the e⁄ect of the level of
data aggregation. In our empirical analysis we implement a recent procedure, discussed in
Guimarªes and Portugal (2009), that allows for the estimation of models with two high-
dimensional ￿xed e⁄ects. As we show later, using data disaggregated at worker level and
controlling for both sources of heterogeneity signi￿cantly reduces the magnitude of rent
sharing.
In contrast to most previous studies, when de￿ning ￿rm ownership we do not impose
any threshold value of private ownership, but rather treat it as a continuous variable
representing the fraction of shares held by private shareholders. The richness of our data
also allows us to compare the magnitude of rent sharing, and the respective impact of ￿rm
ownership, across di⁄erent economic sectors.
Our empirical analysis is preceded by a theoretical section where we build a model
that combines union-￿rm wage bargaining with e¢ ciency wage e⁄ects, and allows us to
3de￿ne a measure of the degree of rent sharing. The received theoretical literature does
not o⁄er a consensual answer to the question of what distinguishes ￿rms with private
and public ownership. The two most commonly explored di⁄erences are related to ￿rm
objectives and productive e¢ ciency, where the latter can sometimes be a result of the
former. Public and private ￿rms having di⁄erent objectives is a standard approach in the
literature on mixed oligopolies, where it is typically assumed that private ￿rms maximise
pro￿ts while public ￿rms have a broader objective, taking also the interests of consumers
and workers into account (see, e.g., DeFraja and Delbono, 1989; Cremer et al., 1991; Haskel
and Szymanski, 1993; Ishida and Matsushima, 2009). Regarding productive e¢ ciency,
although the empirical literature is far from unanimous, there is ample evidence that
private ￿rms have lower production costs than comparable public ones (see Megginson and
Netter, 2001, and several references therein). Such a di⁄erence in productive e¢ ciency
might be explained by agency theory and contract incompleteness.2
The two above-mentioned di⁄erences between public and private ￿rms are also in-
cluded in our theoretical analysis, where we explore two alternative hypotheses within the
same modelling framework: i) private ￿rms are more pro￿t oriented, and/or ii) private
￿rm ownership implies less job security for workers, leading to increased e⁄ort through
a stronger e¢ ciency wage e⁄ect. While these two hypotheses are clearly not mutually
exclusive, we show that the implications for the degree of rent sharing are quite di⁄erent.
This enables us to use the empirical analysis as an implicit test of the relative importance
of these two explanations.
Our main empirical result is that rent sharing is signi￿cantly higher in ￿rms with a
higher degree of private ownership. This result is qualitatively robust to di⁄erent levels
of analysis ￿￿rm or worker level. It is also robust to alternative de￿nitions of ownership
2For example, Schmidt (1996a, 1996b) shows that the presence of soft budgets implies that managers
of publicly owned ￿rms have weaker incentives to minimise costs, since ex ante threats by the owner
(government) to shrink or shut down ine¢ cient ￿rms are not credible. In a context of mixed oligopoly,
Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) show that higher productive e¢ ciency in private ￿rms could also be
due to strategic investment in cost-reducing e⁄orts. In a di⁄erent approach, Haskel and Sanchis (1995)
focus on worker e⁄ort rather than managerial e⁄ort and ￿nd that, under certain conditions, privatisation
increases worker e⁄ort, which is assumed to be a result of bargaining between ￿rms and workers. See also
Cavaliere and Scabrosetti (2008) for a survey of the theoretical literature on privatisation and e¢ ciency.
4(based on threshold values of private ownership shares) and to the use of di⁄erent control
groups. Thus, using a particularly rich and extensive panel dataset, we obtain a result
that runs contrary to the existing (though scant) empirical literature on this particular
topic. Based on our theoretical analysis, this result cannot be explained by di⁄erences in
the degree of pro￿t orientation and is thus not consistent with the hypothesis that the only
e⁄ect of privatisation is that ￿rms become more pro￿t oriented. However, the result can
be explained by stronger e¢ ciency wage e⁄ects due to less job security in private ￿rms.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we lay out the
conceptual framework to explain how ￿rm ownership can a⁄ect the degree of rent sharing.
In Section 3, we describe the data and the institutional background, and present descriptive
statistics of the sample. The empirical analysis, both at ￿rm and worker level, is reported
in Section 4. Section 5 o⁄ers further robustness results. We conclude the analysis by
Section 6.
2 A theoretical framework
Our point of departure is a right-to-manage bargaining framework where wages are subject
to bargaining between a ￿rm and a trade union prior to the ￿rm￿ s choice of employment
level. In order to allow for several di⁄erent e⁄ects of public versus private ￿rm ownership,
we extend the standard framework in two directions: (i) allowing ￿rms to deviate from
pro￿t-maximising behaviour, and (ii) allowing for e¢ ciency wage e⁄ects.
Abstracting from non-labour inputs, we assume that the ￿rm￿ s production function
is given by y = ￿L, where L denotes the level of employment and ￿ is a productivity
parameter re￿ ecting worker e⁄ort. We allow for e¢ ciency wage e⁄ects by assuming that
labour productivity is given by
￿ = ￿ + ￿(w ￿ w)
￿ ; ￿ 2 (0;1); (1)
where w is the wage paid by the ￿rm and w is the workers￿reservation wage level. This is
5a standard reduced-form e¢ ciency wage relationship, where worker e⁄ort depends, partly,
on the di⁄erence between inside and outside options.3 The parameter ￿ ￿ 0 measures
the strength of the e¢ ciency wage e⁄ect. Thus, as long as ￿ is strictly positive, the wage
level a⁄ects production directly through the e¢ ciency wage mechanism, implying that the
￿rm￿ s output can be expressed as y (w;L) = ￿(w)L.
Assuming that the ￿rm faces a downward sloping demand curve, p(y), pro￿ts are given
by
￿ (w;L) = R(w;L) ￿ wL; (2)
where the revenue function is R(w;L) = p(y (w;L))y (w;L). We allow for non-pro￿t-
maximising behaviour by assuming that the ￿rm￿ s objective function is given by
￿(w;L) = ￿ (w;L) + ￿sS (w;L) + ￿uU (w;L); ￿s ￿ 0; ￿u ￿ 0; (3)
where S (￿) is consumers￿surplus and U (￿) is union utility (to be de￿ned below). Thus,
the parameters ￿s and ￿u are inverse measures of the degree of pro￿t orientation. Strictly
positive values of ￿s and ￿u are frequently used assumptions for public ￿rms, re￿ ecting the
fact that governments￿concern for re-election would lead them to take the preferences of
various interest groups into consideration (see, e.g., Haskel and Szymanski, 1993; Haskel
and Sanchis, 1995; Ishida and Matsushima, 2009).
Workers are represented by a trade union whose objective is to maximise a Stone-
Geary-type utility function given by
U (w;L) = (w ￿ w)
￿ L; (4)
where the parameter ￿ > 0 measures how much the union values wages relative to employ-
ment. A standard interpretation of ￿ is that it represents the relative power of insiders
versus outsiders, where the former are more protected against layo⁄s and want to push up
wages to a larger degree than the latter (see, e.g., Sanfey, 1995).
3Similar functional forms are used by, e.g., Summers (1988) and Garino and Martin (2000).
6Assuming Nash bargaining with zero fallback payo⁄for both players, the wage is given
by
w￿ = argmaxf￿ lnU (w;L(w)) + (1 ￿ ￿)ln￿(w;L(w))g; (5)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the relative bargaining strength of the union and L(w) solves
@￿(w;L)=@L = 0.
By some manipulation of the ￿rst-order condition of the maximisation problem spe-
ci￿ed in (5), we can express the bargained wage as follows:
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With the above wage formulation, the degree of rent-sharing is given by the parameter ￿,
which depends on the parameters ￿, ￿, ￿s and ￿u, as well as the endogenous variables ￿,
 , ￿ and ￿.4;5 Thus, there are several di⁄erent channels through which the degree of rent-
sharing is determined. It is straightforward to con￿rm that the degree of rent-sharing (￿)
is increasing in ￿, ￿, ￿s, ￿u, ￿,   and ￿, while decreasing in ￿. However, these channels are
obviously not all independent of each other. A change in any of the exogenous parameters
(￿, ￿, ￿s, ￿u) will generally have indirect e⁄ects on rent-sharing through the endogenous
4If we assume away non-pro￿t-maximising behaviour and e¢ ciency wage e⁄ects, i.e., ￿s = ￿u = ￿ = 0,
the wage formulation in (6), and the corresponding rent-sharing coe¢ cient, are similar to the ones derived
by Mumford and Dowrick (1994).
5Notice that a well-de￿ned maximisation problem implies ￿ > ￿ and ￿ + ￿s  + ￿u￿ < 1 for w = w
￿.
7variables (￿,  , ￿, ￿).6;7
How is the degree of private versus public ￿rm ownership likely to a⁄ect the degree of
rent-sharing? Assuming that the wage orientation (￿) and relative bargaining strength (￿)
of unions are constant across di⁄erent ownership con￿gurations, we postulate two di⁄erent
(but not necessarily mutually exclusive) hypotheses about the e⁄ects of ￿rm ownership
changes (privatisations or nationalisations), both of which have a foundation in existing
theory.
(i) Privatisation implies a change in ￿rm objectives towards more pro￿t orientation.
A standard assumption in the economics literature on private versus public corporate
ownership is that private ￿rms maximise pro￿ts while public ￿rms maximise something
else, usually some linear combination of pro￿ts and the utility of di⁄erent interest groups
in the economy. In our model, this hypothesis corresponds to an inverse relationship
between the degree of private ownership and the parameters ￿s and ￿u; in other words,
privatisation of a ￿rm implies a reduction in one or both of ￿s and ￿u. A reduction in ￿s
or ￿u will directly reduce the degree of rent-sharing, but this direct e⁄ect is complemented
by potential indirect e⁄ects through ￿,  , ￿ and ￿, making the overall e⁄ect a priori
ambiguous.
(ii) Privatisation implies a reduction in job security for workers. With respect to
labour market characteristics, an important di⁄erence between public and private ￿rms
(at least in most European countries) is that workers in public ￿rms are subject to speci￿c
employment rules which, due to more restrictive dismissal rules, allow them to enjoy a
higher degree of job security (see, e.g., Friebel and Magnac, 2007; OECD, 2008). It seems
6While ￿ represents the elasticity of labour demand, ￿,   and ￿ measure the marginal wage e⁄ect on,
respectively, revenues per worker, consumers￿surplus per worker and union utility per worker, for a given
level of employment (i.e., the marginal e¢ ciency wage e⁄ect). Notice also that ￿ = 1 for a rent-maximising
union (￿ = 1).
7The bargained wage in (6) is an interior solution. However, if ￿s and ￿u are su¢ ciently large, this
solution implies negative pro￿ts for the ￿rm. Thus, if we impose a limited liability constraint on the ￿rm,
the solution might be one where this constraint binds. Suppose that the pro￿ts of the ￿rm must be at least
B (in the case of a public ￿rm, B might even be negative). If this constraint binds, the ￿rm will always set




L , implying that the rent-sharing coe¢ cient is equal to one (i.e., the
maximum degree of rent-sharing). For the remainder of the analysis, we disregard this possibility, which
essientially implies that we assume ￿s + ￿u to be su¢ ciently small for an interior solution to exist.
8reasonable to expect that the degree of job security would in￿ uence the strength of any
e¢ ciency wage e⁄ect. More speci￿cally, a relative improvement in inside versus outside
options should have a stronger motivational e⁄ect on workers (in terms of e⁄ort) if the
degree of job security is lower.8 In the extreme case of 100% job security, there would be
no e¢ ciency wage motive for expending e⁄ort, since the inside option can be secured with
certainty.9 In our model, we would therefore expect an inverse relationship between the
degree of job security and the parameter ￿ in the labour productivity function (1). From
(7) we see that ￿ does not a⁄ect the degree of rent-sharing directly, but only indirectly
through ￿,  , ￿ and ￿.
In order to analyse the e⁄ects of ￿s, ￿u and ￿ on the degree of rent-sharing, we need to
make some assumptions on the demand function p(y). In the following we will consider two
di⁄erent cases: linear and iso-elastic demand. Closed-form solutions for the key variables
are presented in Table 1. The most important observation we can make at this stage is
to notice that neither ￿ nor ￿ + ￿s  + ￿u￿ depend on the weight placed on consumers￿
surplus (￿s). Since (R + ￿sS + ￿uU)=L is also independent of ￿s, it follows from (6) that
the bargained wage is likewise independent of the degree to which the ￿rm cares about
consumers￿surplus. Consequently, there are no indirect e⁄ects through the bargained
wage and we can conclude that changes in ￿s do not a⁄ect the degree of rent-sharing
between a ￿rm and its workers, as measured by the parameter ￿. This conclusion holds
for the case of linear as well as for iso-elastic demand, and it holds regardless of whether
there are e¢ ciency wage e⁄ects or not. Thus, the only way a change in pro￿t orientation
can a⁄ect the degree of rent-sharing is through the weight on union utility in the ￿rm￿ s
objective function.
Having excluded the possibility of a (positive or negative) relationship between ￿s and
￿, the two remaining parameters of interest are ￿u and ￿, implying two very di⁄erent
mechanisms for ￿rm ownership to a⁄ect rent-sharing. In order to analyse these two mech-
8See also Goerke (1998) for a discussion of stronger e¢ ciency wage e⁄ects in private ￿rms due to lower
job security.
9Although higher job security reduces the e¢ ciency wage e⁄ect, there might of course still be a positive
relationship between wages and e⁄ort, for example due to fair wage considerations (Akerlof and Yellen,
1990), even for the case of 100% job security.
9Table 1: Closed-form solutions for key variables
Linear demand Iso-elastic demand













































Notation: $ := w ￿ w; ! := w ￿ ￿u$￿
anisms, we rely on numerical simulations based the expressions derived in Table 1. The
e⁄ects of a change in ￿rm objectives (￿u) for the cases of linear and iso-elastic demand are
reported in Table 2, while the corresponding e⁄ects of a change in job security (￿) are re-
ported in Table 3. In each case, we show the results for di⁄erent values (￿low￿and ￿high￿ )
of union wage orientation (￿) bargaining power (￿). Since the degree to which ￿rms take
consumers￿surplus into account has been shown to have no e⁄ect on rent-sharing, we set
￿s = 0. Furthermore, we include each of the two mechanisms separately, by setting ￿ = 0
when examining changes in ￿rm objectives, and setting ￿u = 0 when analysing changes in
job security.10
Consider ￿rst the e⁄ects of a change in ￿rm objectives towards more pro￿t orientation
(Table 2). This will naturally lead to a lower bargained wage and higher pro￿ts. The
e⁄ects on employment and revenues are ambiguous and depend on whether the union is
wage oriented (￿ > 1) or employment oriented (￿ < 1). A shift towards more pro￿t orient-
ation will increase (reduce) employment and revenues if the union is wage (employment)
oriented. If the ￿rm bargains with a rent-maximising union (￿ = 1), employment and
10Analysing changes in ￿rm objectives in the presence of e¢ ciency wage e⁄ects, or analysing changes
in job security in the presence of non-pro￿t-maximising behaviour, would not qualitatively alter the main
results.
10Table 2: Change in ￿rm objectives
Part A: linear demand
￿ = 1 ￿ = 1
2
￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
2 ￿ = 3
2
￿u = 0 ￿u = 1
4 ￿u = 0 ￿u = 1
4 ￿u = 0 ￿u = 1
4 ￿u = 0 ￿u = 1
4
w 0:300 0:333 0:500 0:600 0:314 0:374 0:467 0:530
L 0:350 0:350 0:250 0:250 0:343 0:365 0:267 0:259
R 0:228 0:228 0:188 0:188 0:225 0:232 0:196 0:192
￿ 0:123 0:111 0:063 0:038 0:118 0:095 0:071 0:055
￿ 0:143 0:143 0:600 0:600 0:167 0:167 0:500 0:500
￿ 0:222 0:276 0:545 0:615 0:250 0:322 0:500 0:560
Parameter values: ￿s = ￿ = 0; a = b = ￿ = 1; w = 1
5
Part B: iso-elastic demand
￿ = 1 ￿ = 1
2
￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
2 ￿ = 3
2
￿u = 0 ￿u = 1
4 ￿u = 0 ￿u = 1
4 ￿u = 0 ￿u = 1
4 ￿u = 0 ￿u = 1
4
w 0:250 0:267 0:350 0:400 0:240 0:266 0:400 0:470
L 4:000 4:000 2:041 2:041 4:340 6:153 1:562 1:321
R 2:000 2:000 1:429 1:429 2:083 2:480 1:250 1:149
￿ 1:000 0:933 0:714 0:612 1:042 0:846 0:625 0:528
￿ 0:400 0:400 0:857 0:857 0:333 0:333 1:000 1:000
￿ 0:167 0:211 0:300 0:364 0:143 0:246 0:333 0:383
Parameter values: ￿s = ￿ = 0; a = ￿ = 1; " = 2; w = 1
5
revenues are independent of ￿u. Our parameter of foremost interest is the rent-sharing
parameter ￿, and we see that the e⁄ect of a change in ￿rm objectives is qualitatively
unambiguous. All else equal, more pro￿t oriented ￿rms will engage in less rent-sharing
with their workers. This result, which is quite intuitive, holds whether demand is linear
or iso-elastic.11
The e⁄ects of changes in the degree of job security (interpreted as changes in ￿) are
given in Table 3. Intuitively, a stronger e¢ ciency wage e⁄ect leads to higher wages,
productivity and total rents.12 The e⁄ect on employment is ambiguous; increased labour
11Notice that, in these numerical examples, the degree of pro￿t orientation does not a⁄ect labour demand
elasticity (￿) in equilibrium. In this case, it follows clearly from (7) that there is a positive relationship
between ￿u and ￿. The independence between ￿u and ￿ does no longer hold in the presence of e¢ ciency
wage e⁄ects (￿ > 0). However, numerical simulations with di⁄erent parameter con￿gurations (for ￿ > 0)
con￿rm the robustness of the positive relationship between ￿u and ￿.
12As shown by Garino and Martin (2000), wage bargaining and e¢ ciency wage e⁄ects have mutually
reinforcing e⁄ects on equilibrium wages.
11productivity has a labour-saving e⁄ect if demand is linear, while there might be a labour-
augmenting e⁄ect with iso-elastic demand.13 For the parameter con￿gurations considered
in Table 3, though, the relationship between job security and rent-sharing does not depend
on the shape of the demand function. In both cases, an increase in ￿ leads to a higher
degree of rent-sharing between the ￿rm and its workers.
Table 3: Change in job security
Part A: linear demand
￿ = 1 ￿ = 1
2
￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
2 ￿ = 3
2
￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4
w 0:254 0:301 0:362 0:504 0:259 0:297 0:346 0:485
L 0:487 0:401 0:3312 0:245 0:480 0:406 0:352 0:256
￿ 0:558 0:738 0:601 0:914 0:561 0:733 0:595 0:900
R 0:198 0:208 0:159 0:174 0:197 0:209 0:166 0:178
￿ 0:074 0:009 0:040 0:050 0:072 0:089 0:044 0:053
￿ 0:244 0:481 0:187 0:375 0:238 0:488 0:190 0:378
￿ 0:188 0:281 0:633 0:691 0:203 0:273 0:553 0:648
￿ 0:264 0:316 0:575 0:598 0:281 0:307 0:539 0:578
Parameter values: ￿s = ￿u = 0; a = b = 1; w = 1
5; ￿ = ￿ = 1
2
Part B: iso-elastic demand
￿ = 1 ￿ = 1
2
￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
2 ￿ = 3
2
￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4 ￿ = 1
4 ￿ = 3
4
w 0:265 0:297 0:383 0:445 0:250 0:271 0:463 0:590
L 2:007 2:075 1:030 1:101 2:223 2:383 0:733 0:695
￿ 0:564 0:734 0:607 0:871 0:556 0:700 0:628 0:969
R 1:064 1:234 0:791 0:979 1:112 1:291 0:678 0:820
￿ 0:532 0:617 0:395 0:490 0:556 0:646 0:339 0:410
￿ 0:231 0:487 0:184 0:387 0:251 0:545 0:180 0:366
￿ 0:434 0:497 0:870 0:888 0:350 0:381 1:034 1:081
￿ 0:197 0:247 0:324 0:355 0:167 0:207 0:362 0:399
Parameter values: ￿s = ￿u = 0; a = 1; " = 2; w = 1
5; ￿ = ￿ = 1
2
Due to our decomposition of the di⁄erent forces that determine the degree of rent-
sharing, we are able to pinpoint the exact mechanism that drives the positive relationship
13In general, higher labour productivity has two opposite e⁄ects on labour demand. On the one hand,
the demand for labour increases due to the decrease in the e⁄ective wage rate (w=￿).On the other hand, it
takes fewer worker to produce a certain quantity of output, which, all else equal, reduces labour demand.
The ￿rst e⁄ect is more likely to dominate if product demand is iso-elastic rather than linear.
12between ￿ and ￿. From the numerical simulations we see that the result is driven by the
positive relationship between ￿ and ￿. More speci￿cally, the positive relationship between
￿ and ￿ is caused by the fact that lower job security reinforces the positive relationship
between wages and rents per worker. In other words, the stronger the rent-augmenting
e⁄ect of wages, the more the ￿rm is willing to share the rents with its workers (in the form
of higher wages).
Numerous attempts with di⁄erent parameter con￿gurations suggest that the main
results reported above hold more generally. The only exception is for the case of linear
demand, where low values of ￿ might reverse the previously reported positive relationship
between ￿ and ￿. This leads us to the following conclusion: If an increase in private
￿rm ownership leads to less rent-sharing, this is most likely explained by a shift in ￿rm
objectives towards more pro￿t orientation. However, we cannot rule out an e¢ ciency
wage explanation. On the other hand, if an increase in private ownership leads to more
rent-sharing, this can only be explained (within our class of possible explanations) by an
e¢ ciency wage mechanism related to changes in job security.
3 Data and institutional background
3.1 Data
In the empirical analysis we rely on data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP). This is a com-
prehensive matched employer-employee dataset collected annually for the Portuguese eco-
nomy. QP provides rich and detailed information for each ￿rm or worker observed. For
instance, we know the number of employees, sales, precise geographic location and legal
status of each ￿rm. The worker records contain a number of di⁄erent characteristics, such
as gender, education, age, labour earnings, length of working time, exact admission date
in the ￿rm and wage bargaining regime.
For the speci￿c purposes of this study, QP o⁄ers several advantages that are partic-
ularly relevant. First, QP covers virtually the whole corporate sector, comprising both
state-owned and privately owned ￿rms. It also contains detailed information about the
13ownership structure of each ￿rm. In particular, the exact ownership shares held by the
state and private owners are known at each moment in time. This allows us to build a
continuous variable ￿intensity of private ownership ￿in order to assess the e⁄ects private
versus public ownership on the degree of rent-sharing. Traditionally, related literature (on
public-private wage di⁄erentials and e⁄ects of privatisation) has relied on a dichotomous
ownership variable which obviously depends on a pre-de￿ned threshold of private (public)
ownership share.14 We are also able to distinguish between domestic and foreign private
shareholders.
Second, our linked data allows us to build panel datasets de￿ned at di⁄erent observed
units. As ￿rms and workers are assigned unique and invariant identi￿ers, it is possible to
follow each unit over time and then build panel datasets at di⁄erent levels.15 Therefore,
beyond the control of di⁄erent sources of ￿xed unobserved heterogeneity (worker and ￿rm),
we are able to assess directly the importance of the level and the quality of data for the
magnitude of rent sharing. Until now, despite the ￿ urry of studies on this topic, no study
has yet controlled for this speci￿c dimension.
Finally, QP are available since the mid-80s. This extensive time coverage makes the
data particularly appropriate for our analysis. During this period, Portugal launched
an ambitious and successful privatisation program which fully reversed the ownership of
several companies that had been nationalised after the April revolution of 1974 (OECD,
2001). The privatisation program involved a large number of ￿rms covering almost all
industries. Initially, privatisation took place mainly in the ￿nancial sector (banking and
insurance) but later spread to other services and manufacturing.16 The process has not
yet been concluded but the government has withdrawn its presence in most sectors, such
as brewery, paper and pulp, cement, oil and highways. In some strategic sectors (telecom-
munications and energy) the state has retained a quali￿ed stake in capital or special voting
rights (￿ golden shares￿ ), which allows some control of ￿rm management. Therefore, QP
14In the present study, we also use the dichotomous approach as a robustness check (Section 5).
15Notice that, in contrast with other rich datasets, our data covers all workers (not only worker samples)
within each ￿rm.
16For details about the privatisation program in Portugal, see Sousa and Cruz (1995) and OECD (2001,
2003).
14not only o⁄ers a group of ￿rms that switch ownership over time, which is important for
identi￿cation of the e⁄ects, but also contains a number of ￿rms with di⁄erent ownership
shares in each industry. As we document below, we use this latter group of ￿rms to control
for industry-speci￿c shocks and to disentangle ownership from industry e⁄ects.
We have performed extensive checks to guarantee the accuracy of ￿rm and employee
data. Excluding agriculture, our initial panel for the period 1986-2007 comprises 757 984
￿rms. Information on ownership structure is absent for 40% (303 253) of these ￿rms and
incomplete for another 7% (54 401). After numerous consistency checks on the variables
related to ownership structure, we are able to recapture missing information on 47 301
￿rms. We drop the remaining 7 100 ￿rms with missing information. We also drop 35 ￿rms
for which information on ownership structure is unreliable and 68 563 which appear only
once in the total panel. After these initial checks we kept 379 033 ￿rms for the analysis.
Almost all these ￿rms (99,6%) do not experience any change in ownership structure over
time. Among these, 377 364 are fully private, 287 are fully public and 121 have mixed
private-public ownership. The remaining 1 261 ￿rms experience a change in public-private
ownership shares. Due to computational limitations, we further restrict the panel by
keeping a random sample of 5% of the fully private ￿rms.
We then merged the resulting ￿rm panel with worker records.17 We include only full-
time wage earners working at least 25 hours per week, aged between 16 and 65. The
resulting panel comprises information on 16 498 fully private ￿rms, 252 fully public ￿rms,
98 ￿rms with mixed public-private ownership and 950 ￿rms that change public-private
ownership structure, yielding a total of 118 475 ￿rm-year observations which correspond
to 4 717 568 worker-year observations.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
The left graph of Figure 1 displays the net change in private ownership for the 950 ￿rms
over the period 1986-2007, while the one on the right shows the corresponding distribution
17Before merging, the worker records has been extensively cleaned to remove inconsistencies and to
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Figure 1: Distribution of ownership changes
of yearly changes (1 543 in total).18 Both graphs exhibit substantial positive and negative
variations in the private ownership share, implying the coexistence of contrasting reforms:
privatisation and nationalisation. Nevertheless, privatisations are clearly more abundant.
Almost two thirds of the 1 543 yearly changes in private ownership are positive. In net
terms, 566 (231) ￿rms experience an increase (reduction) in private ownership while 153
￿rms are subject to symmetric ownership changes over time. Full privatisation involves
203 ￿rms (around 21%) while full nationalisation includes 70 (below 8%). Moreover,
the number of ￿rms that changed from a public majority to a private majority (351)
is almost three times the number of ￿rms that changed in the opposite direction (120).
Finally, in terms of speed of ownership changes, ￿rms experience on average less than 2
(1543=950 = 1:62) rounds on the sale of shares. Approximately 60 per cent of ￿rms were
sold in the ￿rst round whereas only 6 per cent involved four or more rounds.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the net change in private ownership for 950 ￿rms
18The graph on right side of Figure 1 displays changes in ownership shares that are di⁄erent from zero.
16across 18 industries over the period 1986-2007. As the ￿gure illustrates, the distribution of
net changes (mainly the positive ones) is spread across all industries, although it is more
noticeable within the service industries. We use this group of changing ownership ￿rms
along with ￿rms with di⁄erent ownership ￿fully private, fully public and mixed ownership
￿within each industry to control for speci￿c business cycles and to disentangle ownership
from industry e⁄ects.
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Figure 2: Distribution of net changes in private ownership
Table 4 reports means and standard deviations of variables for the four groups of ￿rms
de￿ned according to ownership status: changing ownership, fully public, fully private and
mixed ownership. Summary statistics are presented using data aggregated at ￿rm and
worker level. The wage variable is the logarithm of hourly wage computed as the ratio
between overall monthly wage actually paid to each employee (including the base wage,
tenure-related and other regularly paid components) and normal working time (hours).
For measuring rents per worker, we use the logarithm of revenues per worker. Ideally,
17it would be preferable to use net revenue per worker net of non-labor costs (see, e.g.,
Mumford and Dowrick, 1994). However, to the extent that variation in the share of non-
labor costs occurs mainly across rather than within industries, the availability of multiple
units (both ￿rms and workers) per industry, and the use of industry ￿xed e⁄ects in the
regressions, will capture most of this variation.19 Both variables, wages and rents per
worker, have been de￿ ated and are expressed in real terms (prices for 2007) using CPI and
GDP de￿ ators, respectively.
Table 4 shows signi￿cant variation across the four groups of ￿rms. Changing ownership
￿rms are large ￿rms which pay on average the highest (unconditional) hourly wage and
exhibit the higher level of rents per worker, probably re￿ ecting the higher fraction of foreign
shareholders. These ￿rms have a relatively old and experienced, though well educated,
workforce. Fully public ￿rms, on the contrary, despite being the largest, exhibit the lowest
level of rents per worker and pay on average the second largest hourly wage to the oldest
and most experienced workforce in the country. This remarkably high pay level of public
￿rms is likely to re￿ ect considerable di⁄erences with respect to collective wage bargaining.
Public employees are mainly covered by ￿rm-level wage agreements while the majority of
employees from other ￿rms are covered by multi-￿rm wage agreements.
In contrast to public ￿rms, fully private ￿rms are the smallest in Portugal and pay the
lowest (unconditional) hourly wage to the youngest, least experienced and less educated
workforce. Finally, mixed ownership ￿rms are in many aspects somewhat between fully
private and public ￿rms. For instance, mixed ownership ￿rms are larger (smaller) and pay
better (worse) than private (public) ￿rms to an older (younger) and more (less) experienced
workforce than private (public) ￿rms. Nevertheless, the level of rents in mixed ownership
￿rms is much larger than in either public or private ￿rms, probably re￿ ecting the use of the
most educated employees in the country. These ￿rms also employ the largest proportion
of female workers.
19The use of revenues per worker as a proxy for measuring rents, in similar context, has also be done






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We start our analysis by examining how ownership a⁄ects rent sharing at ￿rm-level. In
order to control for ￿rm-speci￿c unobserved heterogeneity, we exploit the longitudinal
nature of the data and estimate a ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects model. More precisely we estimate the
following speci￿cation:
wjt = ￿wjt + ￿1Rjt + ￿2 (Rjt ￿ Pjt) + yjt￿ + ￿j + ￿v + ￿r + ￿t + "jt; (10)
where wjt refers to the logarithm of the average hourly wage of ￿rm j in year t, wjt is the
reservation wage (to be de￿ned below) for workers in ￿rm j in year t, Rjt measures the
logarithm of revenues per worker, Pjt represents the fraction of privately owned shares,
yjt is a vector of ￿rm characteristics, ￿j is a pure ￿rm unobserved ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿v is a pure
industry e⁄ect, ￿r is a pure region e⁄ect, ￿t is a pure time e⁄ect and "jt is an exogenous
disturbance. Our main interest lies in the coe¢ cients ￿, ￿1 and ￿2: The ￿rst coe¢ cient
measures how wages react to the reservation wage, which is in￿ uenced by outside employ-
ment opportunities. Measuring the reservation wage (outside option) is problematic as it
should take into account several aspects of the labour market such as local unemployment,
the level of unemployment bene￿ts and the expected real wage for each worker. In absence
of this information, we compute the reservation wage as the minimum of the logarithm
of hourly wage de￿ned at ￿rm level, per year, industry and county.20;21The coe¢ cient
￿1 measures the elasticity of wages with respect to revenues per worker for fully public
￿rms, while ￿2=100 indicates how much this elasticity changes when the degree of private
ownership increases by one percentage point.22
20As Luke and Scha⁄er (2000) and Basu et al. (2005) discuss, there is a number of approaches, none
universal, that have been adopted for de￿ning the alternative wage. It can be computed as averages
or minimum wages from particular regions or sectors or assumed to be proportional to them, using a
local unemployment rate that lowers the alternative wage by exerting downward pressure on wages and
decreasing the probability of obtaining employment. Given the richness of our data, and to guarantee that
the actual wage is larger than the reservation wage, we follow Card et al. (2009) and de￿ne the reservation
wage as the minimum wage within industry, region and year.
21Using alternative measures for the reservation wage, such as the mean wage within industry, region
and year, yields similar results for the remaining coe¢ cients of interest.
22Notice that our theoretical analysis is based on the concept of average rent sharing, where the degree
of rent sharing is de￿ned as the share of the worker￿ s revenue contribution that is paid back to her as wage.
20The vector yjt includes further controls for ￿rm size (log of number of employees),
a dichotomous variable indicating the presence of foreign shareholders, average age of
workers, average tenure of workers, share of workers with tenure less than one year, average
schooling, share of females and two dummy variables that identify three di⁄erent regimes
of wage bargaining: ￿rm level, multi-￿rm bargaining and other. To control for unobserved
industry e⁄ects, we include a full set of seventeen industry-dummies, corresponding to
the economic classi￿cation code de￿ned at the 2-digit level. In addition, the regressions
include six regional dummies de￿ned at NUT2 to account for disparities in earnings across
regions.
4.1 Firm-level analysis
Table 5 displays the results obtained when using speci￿cation (10) or some simpli￿ed
versions of it. The ￿rst three columns use all ￿rms sampled, while columns 4 to 6 restrict
our control groups to fully public, fully private and mixed ownership, respectively. For
each estimate, the standard errors are clustered at ￿rm level to accommodate for non-
independence of ￿rms over time.
Table 5: Rent sharing across ownership: ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects estimates
vs. All vs. Fully vs. Fully vs. Mixed
￿rms public ￿rms private ￿rms ownership








(.001) (.001) (.001) (.004) (.001) (.005)











(.005) (.006) (.006) (.007)
Private share .047
￿￿￿ -.090 -.117 -.116 -.113
Continued on next page...
In contrast, the empirical analysis measures rent sharing at the margin. There is little reason to expect,
theoretically or empirically, that average and marginal rent sharing are equal. However, in the present
paper we are not primarily interested in the magnitude of rent sharing per se, but rather how the degree
of rent sharing is a⁄ected by ￿rm ownership. Nevertheless, the interpretation of our empirical results, in
light of the theoretical analysis, relies on the assumption that ￿rm ownership a⁄ects average and marginal
rent sharing in a qualitatively similar way.
21... table 5 continued
vs. All vs. Fully vs. Fully vs. Mixed
￿rms public ￿rms private ￿rms ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(.016) (.061) (.075) (.074) (.084)
Foreign dummy .007 .007 .011 .007 .012












(.0004) (.0004) (.002) (.0004) (.002)
Tenure .001 .001 -.002 .001 -.002
(.0007) (.0007) (.003) (.0007) (.003)
































(.008) (.008) (.032) (.008) (.036)
Observations 118691 118691 118691 11661 116978 10738
R
2 .219 .23 .23 .364 .23 .344
LogLikelihood -2859.526 -1995.225 -1989.5 -486.196 -1908.7 -1058.946
RMSE .248 .246 .246 .253 .246 .268
Notes: Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 10% ￿￿ : 5% ￿ ￿ ￿ : 1%. All regressions include ￿rm, time,
industry and region ￿xed e⁄ects. RMSE is root mean squared error.
Column 1 reports baseline estimates from our simplest model, which includes controls
for ￿rm, time, industry and regional ￿xed e⁄ects. The estimates show that wages react
positively (as expected) to the outside wage option and the estimated elasticity of wages
22with respect to rents per worker is 0:021. Then we add eight ￿rm observable attributes
and two variables to account for di⁄erent regimes of collective wage bargaining. As can
be seen from column 2, the speci￿cation of the model improves and the estimated e⁄ect
of rents on wages increases, though marginally, to 0:024.23 This ￿gure is well within the
range of elasticities found in the domestic rent-sharing literature, between 0:006 and 0:086,
as reviewed by Monteiro and Portela (2010). For instance, Margolis and Salvanes (2001)
￿nd elasticities between 0:002 and 0:03 for France and between 0:006 and 0:01 for Norway,
while Arai (2003) reports an elasticity of 0:01 for Sweden.
The remaining estimates shown in column 2 are almost all signi￿cant and show the
expected sign. Wages increase with the fraction of private shareholding, ￿rm size, average
age, tenure, and schooling of the workforce. Average wages are particularly large in ￿rms
that bargain at ￿rm level, even though multi-￿rm wage agreements lead to a sizeable wage
premium. Our results also point to a noteworthy gender penalty: average wages decline
by 1% when the share of female workers increase by ten percentage points.
Column 3 breaks down the e⁄ect of rents per worker on wages according to the owner-
ship of the ￿rm. Hence, while fully public ￿rms exhibit a signi￿cant rent-sharing elasticity
of 0:013, raising the share of private ownership by ten percentage points increases it, on
average, by 0:0012. This interaction term is statistically signi￿cant (with a standard error
of 0:005 and a corresponding p-value of 0:018). Its inclusion in the model eliminates the
direct e⁄ect of private shareholding on wages, suggesting that rent-sharing is a plausible
mechanism to explain wage di⁄erences across ￿rms with di⁄erent ownership.
This result is robust to the use of alternative comparison groups, such as fully public
or private ￿rms, as shown in columns 4 and 5. Comparing with mixed ownership ￿rms,
column 6, however, yields a slightly lower estimate, which is statistically insigni￿cant (with
a standard error of 0:007 the coe¢ cient is marginally insigni￿cant). Notice, however, that
this latter model contains much more noise, probably due to a reduced number of ￿rms
in the comparison group, as the standard errors are larger for all variables.
23Therefore, the size of the positive relation between rents per worker and wages is mainly captured by
unobserved time, ￿rm, industry and regional ￿xed e⁄ects levels.
23Throughout speci￿cations 4 to 6 presented in Table 5 the additional covariates show,
in general, the expected sign and statistical signi￿cance.
In sum, our empirical analysis so far, using ￿rm-level data, provides a clear and unam-
biguous result: an increase in private ownership leads to more rent-sharing, as measured
by the elasticity of wages to revenues per worker. Based on our theoretical analysis, this
result cannot be explained by more pro￿t-oriented objectives in ￿rms with larger private
shareholdings. However, the result is consistent with an increased e¢ ciency wage e⁄ect
due to less job security in ￿rms with more private ownership.
4.2 Worker-level analysis
In order to account for the role of worker and ￿rm unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate
a similar speci￿cation to (10) de￿ned at worker level:
wijt = ￿wijt + ￿1Rjt + ￿2 (Rjt ￿ Pjt) + yjt￿ + xit￿ + ￿i + ￿j + ￿v + ￿r + ￿t + "jt; (11)
where wijt is the logarithm of hourly wage of worker i employed in ￿rm j in year t, wijt is
the reservation wage for the corresponding worker i: The reservation wage is de￿ned as the
minimum wage for similar workers in terms of education, gender, occupation, experience
and who work in the same industry and year. Rjt and Pjt are de￿ned as previously whereas
the vector yjt now includes two variables that account for ￿rm size (log of number of
employees) and foreign ownership e⁄ects. The vector xit, de￿ned at worker level, comprises
the following variables: the age of the employee and its square, his tenure (continuous
variable), a dummy variable indicating if tenure is less than one year, the number of
schooling years and two dummy variables identifying the regime of wage bargaining of
each employee: ￿rm-level bargaining, multi-￿rm bargaining or other. ￿i is the employee
unobserved ￿xed e⁄ect and ￿j;￿v;￿r and ￿t are de￿ned as previously.
Table 6 presents results from individual wage estimations when we do not control for
unobserved ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (￿j = 0): Like Table 5, the ￿rst three columns use all em-
ployees working in any of the four ￿rm categories, while columns 4 to 6 restrict our control
24groups to employees from fully public, fully private and mixed ownership ￿rms, respect-
ively. For each estimate, the standard errors are clustered at worker level to accommodate
for non-independence of workers over time. An innovative aspect of our study is that we
use all workers from the same ￿rms used in the estimation of (10), which allows us to
compare the e⁄ect of di⁄erent levels of analysis ￿￿rm or worker ￿on the magnitude of
rent sharing.24
An inspection of Table 6, column2, shows two striking results: individual wages are
much more responsive to the reservation wage and the magnitude of rent sharing, while
statistically signi￿cant, drops remarkably. More precisely, estimates for the wage response
to the reservation wage increases from 0:004 to 0:241 while the rent-sharing elasticity drops
from 0:024 to 0:004. The remaining estimates from column 2 are all signi￿cant, though
the magnitude of the e⁄ects tends to be lower than previously.
When we add an interaction term to account for the private ownership e⁄ect (column
3) the rent-sharing elasticity for public ￿rms drops to 0:001, while the marginal e⁄ect of
private ownership remains closer to earlier ￿ndings obtained with ￿rm level data. Indeed,
raising the degree of private ownership by ten percentage points increases the elasticity, on
average, by 0:0007. Once more, notice that the inclusion of this interaction term reverses
the direct e⁄ect of private ownership on wages.
Table 6: Rent sharing across ownership: worker ￿xed-e⁄ects estimates
vs. All vs. Fully vs. Fully vs. Mixed
￿rms public ￿rms private ￿rms ownership








(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)












Continued on next page...
24In order to strictly compare the e⁄ect of the level of analysis ￿￿rm or worker ￿we would like ideally
to estimate wage regressions at worker level controlling only for ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects. Nevertheless, that is not
feasible as the number of ￿rms is very large in our dataset.
25... table 6 continued
vs. All vs. Fully vs. Fully vs. Mixed
￿rms public ￿rms private ￿rms ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Observations 4621075 4621075 4621075 3317626 3350029 2078514
R
2 .534 .545 .545 .586 .508 .552
LogLikelihood 2298199 2351418 2352510 1740772 1752771 1129998
RMSE .147 .145 .145 .143 .143 .14
Notes: Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 10% ￿￿ : 5% ￿￿￿ : 1%. All regressions include worker, time,
industry and region ￿xed e⁄ects. RMSE is root mean squared error.
Columns 4 to 6 suggest that the comparison group matters for determining the mag-
26nitude of rent-sharing in public and private ￿rms. For instance, when we compare workers
from changing ownership ￿rms to those from fully public ￿rms, rent sharing in public ￿rms
vanishes. The corresponding ￿gure is 0:003 if we instead compare with private or mixed
￿rms. Similarly, the marginal e⁄ect of private ownership on rent-sharing is almost twice
as high when we compare with private ￿rms, relative to using fully public or mixed own-
ership ￿rms as the control groups. Nevertheless, despite all divergences in magnitude, the
results reported so far are all qualitatively similar, suggesting that rent-sharing increases
with the degree of private ownership.
Table 7: Rents and ownership: worker and ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects estimates
vs. All vs. Fully vs. Fully vs. Mixed
￿rms public ￿rms private ￿rms ownership
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Continued on next page...
27... table 7 continued
vs. All vs. Fully vs. Fully vs. Mixed
￿rms public ￿rms private ￿rms ownership





















(.0004) (.0004) (.0005) (.0004) (.0005)
Observations 4621075 4621075 4621075 3317626 3350029 2078514
R
2 .934 .938 .938 .929 .943 .936
LogLikelihood 2228913 2364161 2364433 1723254 1723641 1099604
RMSE .149 .145 .145 .144 .145 .143
Notes: Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 10% ￿￿ : 5% ￿ ￿ ￿ : 1%. All regressions include ￿rm, worker, time,
industry and region ￿xed e⁄ects. RMSE is root mean squared error.
Table 7 displays results when we account simultaneously for worker and ￿rm unob-
served heterogeneity. Given the high dimension of our matched employer-employee data,
the solution to the estimation problem is not trivial. In our estimations we follow the feas-
ible iterative procedure discussed in Guimarªes and Portugal (2009). The authors propose
an exact solution for the least squares estimation of the model with two ￿xed e⁄ects; i.e.,
their solution controls jointly for unobserved heterogeneity at the worker and ￿rm level,
dealing with the great number of workers and ￿rms available in the dataset. One could
argue that a one-way ￿xed-e⁄ects controlling for spell e⁄ects (worker within a given ￿rm)
is readily available. However, such a solution is not an appropriate one as we would be
only controlling for possible correlations between worker and ￿rm speci￿c unobserved het-
erogeneity, and not for each heterogeneity separately. Once the worker moves to a new
￿rm we would assume it as a new worker. Our preferred solution takes both the worker
and the ￿rm as whole identities, accounting for worker heterogeneity that runs over ￿rms,
28as well as for ￿rm heterogeneity that applies to di⁄erent workers employed by the ￿rm in
di⁄erent moments of time.
Compared with Table 6, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity from both sides of the
labour market improves a great deal the speci￿cation of the model, measured either by R2
or Log Likelihood of the model. The results in Table 7 are thus derived from our preferred
speci￿cations. Columns 1 and 2 show that the inclusion of both sources of unobserved
heterogeneity does not a⁄ect the wage responses to the reservation wage but a⁄ects the
magnitude of the rent-sharing elasticity. Indeed, while the former remains similarly strong
in magnitude and signi￿cance, the latter, though statistically signi￿cant, drops from 0:003
to 0:002. Moreover, as before, the rent-sharing elasticity remains unchanged even after
the introduction of several (statistically signi￿cant) controls for observable attributes from
both ￿rm and worker. While the size of the rent-sharing elasticity is now quite low when
compared to previous studies, we are not aware of any study that uses such a rich set of
observable attributes and controls for both sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
Our results from the worker level analysis suggest, once more, that rent-sharing is
higher in private ￿rms. Even though the di⁄erence is substantially attenuated when we
make the extension to control for two instead of one source of unobserved heterogeneity,
private ￿rms still exhibit a level of rent sharing three times higher than publicly owned
￿rms (0:003 and 0:001, respectively).
5 Robustness checks
We now extend our empirical analysis in several di⁄erent directions. Tables 8 and 9
explore the robustness of our analysis by (i) considering alternative de￿nitions for some
key variables, (ii) using alternative estimation methods and (iii) splitting data according
to independent variables. More precisely, Table 8 reports some robustness checks obtained
using only data aggregated at ￿rm level, while Table 9 reports further robustness checks
produced with data aggregated both at ￿rm (Panel A) and worker level (Panel B). In the
analysis with worker level data, we use our preferred speci￿cation which accounts for both
29sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 8: Robustness checks: analysis with ￿rm level data
Private ownership concept Private ￿rm=1 if private shares >= 50% Continuous
Estimation method FE GMM FE
Sample vs. All Private Public vs. All Private Public Weighted by
￿rms ￿rms ￿rms ￿rms employment







(.001) (.001) (.009) (.002) (.002) (.008) (.006)
Rents per worker (R) .014
￿￿￿ .025
￿￿￿ .003 .036 .100
￿￿￿ .056 -0.001





Observations 118691 114670 4021 56871 54973 1788 5865521
LogLikelihood -1989 -1370 621 2114248
RMSE .246 .245 .209 .245 .244 .167 .169
Hansen-J .310 .407 .098
DF 1 1 1
Notes: Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 10% ￿￿ : 5% ￿ ￿ ￿ : 1%. RMSE is root mean squared error. DF
stands for degrees of freedom.
Column 1 from Table 8 presents the results of speci￿cation (10) when ownership is
de￿ned as a binary variable using the common threshold of 50% for private ownership.25
The restriction of equal returns (both to ￿xed unobserved e⁄ects and ￿rm attributes)
imposed on private and public ￿rms is relaxed in columns 2 and 3, where we estimate a
separate wage equation for each type of ￿rm.
Changing the concept of ownership and allowing the process of wage formation to di⁄er
across ownership categories only con￿rms our previous ￿ndings. As before, the magnitude
25Our results are not sensitive to di⁄erent cut-o⁄ values.
30of rent sharing is signi￿cantly larger in private than in public ￿rms (columns 1 and 2).
However, column 3 indicates that labour earnings in public ￿rms react neither to local
conditions nor to ￿rm rents. Notice that these results should be read with some caution
as the sample size drops remarkably.
Even though we have a rich set of observable ￿rm attributes and control for ￿rm,
worker and other unobserved ￿xed e⁄ects, we empirically address the possibility that
controlling for rents￿endogeneity reverses our previous ￿ndings. In columns 4 to 6 we
adopt the ownership concept and partition considered in the previous three columns and,
in the absence of external instruments, we use lagged rents as instruments for current
rents.26 By construction, these are correlated with current rents, but ￿assuming no serial
correlation in the error term ￿are not correlated with the residuals in a ￿rm level equation.
To be precise, in column 4 we instrument ￿rm rents, and the respective interaction term,
using the ￿rst and second lags of ￿rm rents and the ￿rst lag of the interaction term, while
in column 5 and 6, we instrument ￿rm rents using its ￿rst and second lags. All other
explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous.
Performing a GMM ￿xed-e⁄ects type of estimation, which provides e¢ cient estimates
of the relevant coe¢ cients as well as consistent estimates of the standard errors, our
main ￿nding from the previous analysis is, once more, qualitatively con￿rmed. While
the Hansen-J test of over-identifying restrictions validates the instruments chosen in each
speci￿cation, the standard errors of the coe¢ cients of interest are now much larger and
weaken the precision of the estimates. The only exception is presented in column 5. Using
instruments, the rent-sharing coe¢ cient for private ￿rms is signi￿cant and four times larger
than the one previously found, while the corresponding ￿gure for public ￿rms, though much
larger, is not signi￿cant (its standard error is 0:037 with a corresponding p-value of 0:125).
Notice that the higher rent-sharing elasticity obtained when instrumenting ￿rm rents is a
common ￿nding in the rent-sharing literature.
So far, in our ￿rm level analysis, we have weighted all ￿rms equally when estimating
26It is not possible to accommodate instrument variables within our routine that accounts for ￿rm and
worker unobserved ￿xed e⁄ect.
31the e⁄ect of ownership on rent sharing. Nevertheless, Table 4 shows that ￿rm size varies
substantially across di⁄erent ownership con￿gurations. In particular, public ￿rms are
much larger than private ￿rms. Weighting observations by employment will increase the
importance of large ￿rms (which are mainly public) and reduce the in￿ uence of small
￿rms (with larger rent sharing) in the estimation. Thus, we would expect that weighting
observations by ￿rm size will reduce the estimated level of rent sharing. Indeed, column 7
shows that weighting by employment reduces the rent e⁄ect for both types of ￿rms while
the interaction term that accounts for the e⁄ect of private ownership on rent sharing is in
line with earlier estimates.
Following the received literature, our measure of rents has been expressed in per capita
terms. If ￿rms adjust the labour force in terms of working hours rather than number of
employees, our rent measure might be biased in either direction. It turns out, as column 1
from Table 9 shows, that controlling for working hours only reinforces our earlier ￿ndings.
The rent e⁄ect becomes clearly stronger in private than in public ￿rms, using either ￿rm
and worker level data. However, the magnitude of rent sharing in public ￿rms evolves
in opposite directions in the two analyses. In fact, while the rent e⁄ect disappears in
public ￿rms when using ￿rm level data, it becomes even stronger when using worker
level data. These contrasting ￿ndings, when seen in conjunction, suggest that labour
adjustments di⁄er across ownership categories and that the level of analysis does matter
for the magnitude of rent sharing.
Table 9: Robustness checks: analysis with ￿rm and worker level data
Panel A: Firm level data, ￿rm FE
Sample Rents Survival Manufacturing Services Private share
per hour of ￿rm > 4 increase decline








(.001) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.002)






(.005) (.005) (.010) (.006) (.005) (.007)
Continued on next page...
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(.005) (.006) (.010) (.006) (.005) (.007)
Observations 118691 99942 26239 92452 118319 83392
LogLikelihood -1819 -5112 3801 -4264 -2031 5135
RMSE .246 .255 .210 .253 .246 .228
Panel B: Worker level data, worker and ￿rm FE
Sample Rents Survival Manufacturing Services Private share
per hour of ￿rm > 4 increase decline








(.0004) (.0004) (.0007) (.0005) (.0004) (.0005)














(.0002) (.0002) (.0005) (.0003) (.0002) (.0003)
Observations 4621079 4493329 1423761 3156913 4579285 2775270
R
2 .9092 .9075 .9054 .9067 .9094 .9118
RMSE .1943 .1941 .1894 .1941 .1944 .1908
Notes: Signi￿cance levels: ￿ : 10% ￿￿ : 5% ￿ ￿ ￿ : 1%. RMSE is root mean squared error.
Intuitively, we would expect stronger rent e⁄ects for ￿rms that stay longer in the
market. However, results obtained from imposing a ￿rm survival restriction of four years
(column 2) seem to be inconclusive. While rent sharing is always larger in private than in
public ￿rms, in both analyses, the rent-sharing e⁄ect increases only marginally for private
￿rms when using data at ￿rm level. For public ￿rms, rent e⁄ects in both analyses are in
line with previous ￿ndings.
We would also like to explore the possibility that our estimated e⁄ects might vary
across di⁄erent sectors of the economy, due to institutional or other di⁄erences that have
33not yet been accounted for in our empirical analysis. One potentially important institu-
tional heterogeneity is that wage bargaining takes place mainly along industry divisions
in manufacturing, while in services wage bargaining along occupational divisions is more
common. In order to account for such di⁄erences, we have run separate regressions for
manufacturing and services. Columns 4 and 5 disclose important discrepancies across
these two sectors. Rent sharing is substantially higher in manufacturing than in services,
with ￿gures (at ￿rm level, not shown) for the wage-rents elasticity of 0:034 and 0:021,
respectively. It is also clear that the evidence of higher rent sharing in private than in
public ￿rms depends both on the sector and level of analysis. The e⁄ect of increased
private ownership on rent sharing is positive in both sectors for both levels of analysis.
However, at ￿rm level the e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant only for services, while at worker
level the e⁄ect is signi￿cant only for manufacturing.
Given the institutionally rich Portuguese context, with both privatisations and na-
tionalisations of ￿rms, it is natural to ask whether increases and reductions in private
ownership lead to similar (symmetric) rent-sharing e⁄ects. Columns 6 and 7 split the data
according to the sign of yearly changes in private ownership.27 The results reveal that
the relationship between ownership and rent sharing is not particularly sensitive to this
partition of the data, though the e⁄ect of private ownership on rent sharing tends to be
larger for nationalisations than for privatisations.
6 Concluding Remarks
Private ￿rms tend to share the rents with their workers to a larger extent than their public
counterparts. This (perhaps surprising) result is the main conclusion of our empirical
analysis based on an extensive and rich linked employer-employee dataset, covering a
large number of ownership changes (in both directions) across a wide spectrum of economic
sectors in Portugal over a long time period.
When seen in the light of our underlying theoretical framework, the perhaps most
27Notice that, since we include in both estimations data referring to no changes in ownership, the sum
of observations in these two columns exceeds the total number of observations in the data.
34interesting implication of this result is that it cannot be explained by the often postulated
hypothesis that private ￿rms are more pro￿t oriented than public ones. Rather, our result,
when seen in conjunction with the theoretical analysis, indicates that other di⁄erences are
more important. Speci￿cally, we have shown that a positive relationship between the
degree of private ownership and rent sharing can be explained by a higher e¢ ciency wage
e⁄ect due to less job security in private ￿rms.
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